Future Electricity Sector Utility Ownership & Regulation in Hawaii

Draft Preliminary Results

Maui island

Prepared for Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism (“DBEDT”)
Disclaimer notice

► London Economics International LLC ("LEI") was engaged by the Department of Business Economic Development and Tourism to look at various ownership and regulatory models for the State of Hawaii (also referred to herein as the "Project"). LEI has made the qualifications noted below with respect to the information contained in this preliminary presentation and the circumstances under which the presentation was prepared.

► While LEI has taken all reasonable care to ensure that its analysis is complete, power markets are highly dynamic, and thus certain recent developments may or may not be included in LEI’s analysis. Stakeholders should note that:

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- There can be substantial variation between assumptions and market outcomes analyzed by various consulting organizations specializing in power markets. LEI does not make any representation or warranty as to the consistency of LEI’s analysis with that of other parties.
The primary goals of today’s outreach are to provide preliminary results and obtain final feedback from stakeholders.

1. Provide an overview of analyses performed for the Study

2. Share insights on the preliminary results of the Study

3. Solicit stakeholders’ input for the final report
1. About the study
2. Ownership models
3. Regulatory models
4. Summary of preliminary findings
5. Discussions
DBEDT is directed by the legislation to:

Evaluate alternative utility ownership and regulatory models

Ownership models include: co-ops, investor-owned utilities, Single Buyer, and integrated distribution energy resources ("IDER") system operator

Regulatory models include status quo with HERA, independent system operator, distribution-focused regulatory model, and performance-based regulation

Assess the ability of each model to:

1) Achieve state energy goals
2) Maximize customer cost savings
3) Enable a competitive distribution system
4) Eliminate or reduce conflicts of interest
5) Align interests

Conduct a long-term cost benefit analysis

- Costs required to change from current model to new model
- Legal and regulatory approvals needed for the change
- Impact on revenue requirements and rates
- Effects on distributed energy resources

Source: House Bill 1700
The assessment of potential models consists of multiple layers, including various analyses and stakeholder outreaches.

**Key steps taken in the Study**

1. Considered **several potential models** for Hawaii
2. Performed **high-level assessments** including pros/cons, feasibility assessments, and stranded costs
3. Conducted **community outreaches** and one-on-one meetings; incorporated views from the **stakeholders**
4. **Ranked** the alternative models based on state goals and impact to ratepayers
5. Conducted **more in-depth analyses of the alternative models**
6. **Compared results** of alternative utility ownership and regulatory models

Ownership models

Regulatory models

Three feasible **ownership models** for further consideration

Three feasible **regulatory models** for further consideration
According to the stakeholders, lowering the rates now and in the future is a priority

Highest electricity prices in the country

Average price of electricity, residential (June, 2018)

Source: EIA, HECO Companies, Third Party Databases

Other priorities raised by stakeholders

- Responsiveness/ alignment with community priorities
- Infrastructure needs to be resilient and improved
- Local control
- More renewable energy
- Innovation and adoption of new technologies
- Any model must consider the costs
State’s and counties’ distinct characteristics are taken into account in the analyses

Multiple islands

Largest concentration of US military bases and compounds in the country

100% clean energy goal

Achieved RPS vs. 100% RPS target

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City and County of Honolulu</th>
<th>County of Maui</th>
<th>County of Hawaii</th>
<th>County of Kauai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HECO Companies, KIUC

Expected high penetration of DERs

HECO Companies’ forecast cumulative DER capacity

Source: HECO Companies

Aging generation and transmission assets

Age of thermal plants as of 2017

Source: HECO Companies, Third-party database provider
Agenda

1. About the study
2. Ownership models
3. Regulatory models
4. Summary of preliminary findings
5. Discussions
Various utility ownership structures were reviewed ranging from traditional utility-centric models to grid defection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>How does it work?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1) Investor-owned utility (“IOU”)          | • Shareholders (publicly traded or privately held) | • Management is *appointed by the Board*, which has a fiduciary duty to its shareholders  
• Access to capital market to *finance large investments* |
| 2) New parent                              | • Private or not-for-profit                | • Could be *not-for-profit, a limited dividend, or a benefit corporation*        
• Management is appointed by the Board        |
| 3) Municipal utility (“muni”)              | • Owned by the city or the town            | • Governed by *local elected or appointed officials*                           
• Finance energy improvements with *government bonds*  
• Benefit from access to *tax exempt debt financing* and they may also be tax exempt |
| 4) Cooperative (“co-op”)                   | • Owned by the members-customers           | • Management has oversight by its *Board* and in some cases, from *regulators*  
• have access to low cost debt and *special federal financing programs* |
| 5) Hybrid (majority government-owned)       | • Owned majority by the *government*      | • Management is appointed by the *Board*                                       |
| 6) Integrated distribution energy resources (“IDER”) | • Utility (wires assets)                  | • Coordinating flows across the grid can either be done by the utility or another entity |
| 7) Single Buyer (“SB”)                     | • Utility or independent, not-for-profit entity | • SB within the utility is still owned by the utility but have stricter *ring-fencing mechanisms from other businesses*  
• SB could also be outside the utility         |
| 8) Grid defection                          | • Diverse (generation)                     | • Utility would still provide services to customers connected to the grid but at a higher costs |

Step 1: Considered different utility ownership models
The “friendliness” of the acquisition plays a significant role in the feasibility of the ownership model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Stranded costs on generation?</th>
<th>Stranded costs on T&amp;D?</th>
<th>Comply with reliability, adequacy, quality of service?</th>
<th>Require separation of some businesses?</th>
<th>Require costs to move to new model?</th>
<th>Require legal or regulatory changes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Status quo (IOU)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) New parent</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Muni</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Co-op</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Hybrid</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) IDER</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Single Buyer</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Grid defection</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Positive: Green  
Negative: Red  
Can be positive or negative: Grey
“Ownership change will not entirely address our concerns; there is a need for regulatory changes and strong leadership” - Stakeholders

**IOUs (Status quo)**
- Lack of competition
- Misalignment between utility incentives and community interests or policy priorities
- Stable
- Economies of scale
- Can attract a talented workforce

**Munis**
- Politicization
- Not interested because of distrust in political leaders and concerns about them managing a utility
- Issue on ability of government to operate the utility
- More responsive to community interests

**Co-ops**
- Concerns on the acquisition costs
- Could be challenging to engage enough citizens to be active participants
- Direct influence on the decision-making process
- Access to low cost financing
- Motivated to drive down rates

**Wires (IDER and Single Buyer)**
- Complexity and novelty of the model (IDER)
- Limited examples (Single Buyer)
- Ensures fair procurement process
Four ownership models, including IOU, co-op, and SB (within and outside of the utility) were selected for additional review.

Inputs from the stakeholders:

- Achieves state energy goals
- Provides consumer savings
- Reduces conflicts of interest
- Aligns stakeholder interests
- Minimizes costs

Advantages vs. Disadvantages:
- High-level Feasibility analyses
- Regulatory requirements
- Impact on stranded costs

Co-op

Single Buyer (within the utility)

Single Buyer (outside of the utility)

Unique characteristics and challenges of the State

Step 4: Ranked the potential models based on state goals and impact to ratepayers
The SB approach is assumed to have lower cost than the co-op model, but the co-op model possesses greater certainty in implementation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Co-op</th>
<th>Single Buyer (outside of the utility)</th>
<th>Single Buyer (within the utility)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td>No costs</td>
<td>• Cost to acquire assets ($600-700 million) (MECO County-wide)</td>
<td>• Setup costs of at least $3 million (Year One costs) for MECO (county-wide), which may be a low estimate of the total establishment cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-op</td>
<td>• Transaction fees representing 1%-3% of acquisition cost</td>
<td>• Approximately 24-36 months</td>
<td>• 48 months, with significant uncertainty due to the legislative and regulatory processes to establish the single buyer entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>No steps</td>
<td>• No changes to regulation are necessary</td>
<td>• Requires a PUC proceeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>No legal changes</td>
<td>• The burden of proof rests on the co-op to demonstrate that it can meet the laws and regulations already in place</td>
<td>• Requires legislative action to establish a new entity to undertake the planning and procurement responsibilities of the utility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moving to Single Buyer models can lower rates by reducing the costs to procure generation from IPPs, but rates are expected to increase under a co-op model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change of the Ownership Model</th>
<th>Model by island</th>
<th>Model by County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on rates*</td>
<td>Average impact**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to a co-op model</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to a Single Buyer within the utility model</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>-1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to a Single Buyer outside the utility model</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Relative to the Status Quo
** From 2018 to 2045
Agenda

1. About the study
2. Ownership models
3. Regulatory models
4. Summary of preliminary findings
5. Discussions
Various regulatory models appropriate to the State and are not mutually exclusive were assessed

**HERA Model**
- A dedicated body (HERA) would enforce and oversee compliance with formal reliability standards
- HERA would support the PUC in carrying out critical functions related to reliability and grid access oversight functions
- The PUC may contract with a person, business, or organization, (but not a public utility) for the performance of HERA’s functions

**Integrated Grid Operator Model (“IGO”)**
- An independent entity would be responsible for planning and operations, including the dispatch of both the transmission and distribution system
- IGO would also determine the investment requirements of both transmission and distribution networks
- Utilities would continue to own the wires assets, but the operations would be under the IGO

**Distribution System Platform Provider (“DSSP”)**
- Distribution utilities are required to provide a platform for third-party participation in a distribution system marketplace
- Utilities would continue own and operate the distribution system and become the Distributed System Platform Provider (“DSPP”)
- DSPP is responsible for planning and designing its distribution system to be able to integrate DER

**Performance-based regulation (“PBR”)**
- PBR strengthens financial incentives to lower rates and improve non-price performance
- It allows the adjustment of utility revenues based on the utility’s performance

Step 1: Considered different regulatory models
Three potential Hawaii-specific PBR options were identified based on the requirements of the Act and PUC goals

According to the PUC, the PBR should result in:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Status quo</th>
<th>Light PBR</th>
<th>Conventional PBR</th>
<th>Outcomes-Based PBR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Features</strong></td>
<td>Has some PBR mechanisms <em>(see below)</em></td>
<td><em>Easier to implement</em> given timeline set by the legislation</td>
<td>Going-in rates are set for the first year and increase in base rate will be based on <em>inflation less productivity</em></td>
<td>Provides flexibility to the utilities on how to achieve the target outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Term</strong></td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rate-setting approach</strong></td>
<td>Cost of service</td>
<td>Revenue cap using indexing formula</td>
<td>Revenue cap using building blocks approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance incentives mechanisms (“PIM”)</strong></td>
<td>• Reliability &lt;b&gt;• Cost savings in renewable generation procurement&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;• Implementation of DR portfolio&lt;/b&gt;</td>
<td>• Outstanding performance would be rewarded while poor performance would be penalized &lt;b&gt;• Expand current PIM list to include: availability, reliability, cost control, service quality, customer engagement, competitive procurement, RPS targets&lt;/b&gt;</td>
<td>Aligns with the target outcomes (e.g., enhance customer experience, improve utility performance, achieve public policies and goals, attain healthy financial performance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Earning sharing</strong></td>
<td>Customers share the excess earnings like the current mechanism</td>
<td>Customers share the earnings but sharing is symmetrical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment of capex and opex</strong></td>
<td>Biased towards capital expenditures due to the revenue requirements formula</td>
<td>No distinction between capital and operational expenditures (total expenditure approach or “totex”)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Potential regulatory models are feasible, and some may require additional legislative processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Result to stranded costs on generation?</th>
<th>Result to stranded costs on T&amp;D?</th>
<th>Comply with reliability, adequacy, quality of service?</th>
<th>Entail the creation of a new entity to do a function of the utility or PUC?</th>
<th>Require costs to move to new model?</th>
<th>Require legal or regulatory changes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) HERA</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) IGO</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) DSPP</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) PBR</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Positive  
Negative  

Step 2: Performed high level analyses -> stranded costs and feasibility analyses
Stakeholders believe that there is a need to make changes to the current regulatory framework to achieve state goals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Status quo</strong></td>
<td>- Reliable electricity</td>
<td>- does not encourage the utilities to invest sufficiently in improving grid resiliency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- not successful in lowering electric rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- utility is not incentivized to take action or make investments in line with community priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- does not allow sufficient access to the grid for IPPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. HERA</strong></td>
<td>- might increase grid access and increase deployment of renewables</td>
<td>- would be redundant, since the PUC already assumes much of the role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- might increase costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. IGO</strong></td>
<td>- would increase competition</td>
<td>- would be too costly to implement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- the market is too small in Hawaii for an ISO to work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. DSPP</strong></td>
<td>- would increase competition and deployment of DERs</td>
<td>- would not work in Hawaii as the cost would be too high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. PBR</strong></td>
<td>- would be able to link utility revenues to its performance</td>
<td>- would be difficult to design and implement PBR well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Incentives could align utility investments with policy goals</td>
<td>- It might be too risky</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis on the state criteria showed that combining some of the regulatory models would be more effective in facilitating the achievement of state goals.

- Supports state goals
- Addresses conflicts of interest
- Supports transition to competitive distribution
- Ensures quality of service
- Reduces rate volatility

Outcomes-based PBR

Conventional PBR + Light HERA

Hybrid (Outcomes-based PBR + IGO* + DSPP)

*IGO would only be created on Maui island if implemented separately for each island; on Lanai and Molokai, the Hybrid model would consist of Outcomes-based PBR and DSPP models.
## Costs and timeline for the proposed regulatory models increase with the complexity of the model, with Outcomes-based PBR requiring the least time and money

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Status quo</th>
<th>Outcomes-based PBR</th>
<th>Conventional PBR + Light HERA</th>
<th>Hybrid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>No significant cost increases</td>
<td>• Higher PUC average annual expense during transition period; • Total transition cost $1M-$2M (MECO County-wide); • No long-term cost changes beyond transition</td>
<td>• Conventional PBR: Higher PUC average annual expense during transition period, $1M-$2M total, no long-term change (MECO County-wide); • Light HERA: $150k-$200k start up cost and ~20% of that in annual funding (MECO County-wide)</td>
<td>• Outcomes-based PBR: Higher PUC average annual expense during transition period, $1M-$2M total, IGO:$3M-$4M in startup and annual operation costs (MECO County-wide); • DSPP: ~$90M total implementation costs over 3-yr period (MECO County-wide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>No steps</td>
<td>• ~21 months*</td>
<td>• ~21 months for Conventional PBR* • ~33 months for entire model</td>
<td>• Outcomes-based PBR: ~21 months* • IGO: 18-24 months (2023 target implementation) • DSPP: 3+ years (2028 target implementation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal changes</td>
<td>No legal changes needed because PBR falls under existing PUC legal authority</td>
<td>• No legal changes needed for Conventional PBR</td>
<td>• No legal changes needed for Outcomes-based PBR</td>
<td>• No legal changes needed for Outcomes-based PBR • Legislation likely required to authorize creation of IGO • Legislation recommended to authorize creation of DSPP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Costs are Maui County-wide and allocated to each island based on current share of MECO’s rate base
**January 1, 2020 is the deadline imposed by the State for PBR implementation. Although it is possible that the PUC meets this deadline, it is also possible that they will incur delays that lengthen the process)
Moving to all three highly ranked regulatory models would lower rates for customers due to incentives, increased competition, or other PBR mechanisms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change of the Regulatory Model</th>
<th>Model by island</th>
<th>Model by County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on rates*</td>
<td>Average impact**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement an Outcomes-based PBR model</td>
<td>⬇️</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement a Conventional PBR + Light HERA model</td>
<td>⬇️</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement a Hybrid model</td>
<td>⬇️</td>
<td>-2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Relative to the Status Quo
** From 2018 to 2045
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1. About the study
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The more complex the model the longer it takes to set it up

Timeline comparison

Status quo
SQ = 0

Outcomes-based PBR
Outcomes-based PBR = 21

Co-op
Co-op = 24 to 36

Conventional PBR + Light HERA
Conventional PBR = 21
Light HERA = 18 to 24

Single Buyer
Single Buyer = 24-48

Hybrid
Outcomes-based PBR = 21
IGO = 18 to 24
DSPP = 36+
Most of the ownership and regulatory models considered are already authorized and legal under Hawaii law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Legal Changes Required?</th>
<th>Additional Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ownership Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Quo (IOU)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-op</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>• Burden of proof rests on the co-op to demonstrate that it can meet the laws and regulations already in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Buyer</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Legislative action is required to establish a new entity (for the “outside” SB model) to undertake planning and procurement responsibilities from the utility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulatory Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Quo (COS with some PBR mechanisms)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes-based PBR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>• No legal changes needed because PBR falls under existing PUC authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional PBR + Light HERA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>• There is existing regulation already for both PBR and HERA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Legislation needs to be enacted that authorizes and clarifies the DSPP&lt;br&gt;• PUC is not currently authorized to create an IGO, so legislation is needed for the PUC to create that entity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Change in regulatory models are expected to reduce rates more substantially through better incentives to improve efficiency

### Maui

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change of the Ownership Model</th>
<th>Model by island</th>
<th>Model by County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on rates</td>
<td>Average impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to a co-op model</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to a Single Buyer within the utility model</td>
<td>-1.3%</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to a Single Buyer outside the utility model</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change of the Regulatory Model</th>
<th>Model by island</th>
<th>Model by County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on rates</td>
<td>Average impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement an Outcomes-based PBR model</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement a Conventional PBR + Light HERA model</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement a Hybrid model</td>
<td>-2.5%</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key conclusions

- The current ownership and regulatory framework has been **successful** at ensuring utilities **provide reliable service**

- A change in ownership model **does not necessarily address the #1 concern of the stakeholders**, which is to lower the electricity rates now and in the future
  - In fact, a move to the co-op model would likely be more expensive in Maui island relative to the status quo

- On the other hand, regulatory changes have **a greater impact in lowering the electricity rates** due to the PBR incentives

- Benefits of moving to any of the PBR options outweigh the costs

- Implementation of PBR mechanisms could be done on a **staggered basis**; no need to implement all the mechanisms all at once
How to Engage

► We encourage you to submit your feedback and input throughout the stakeholder engagement process:

- During the event, please fill out your worksheet to the best of your ability during discussion with your colleagues. After this event, we plan to collect your worksheets to gather input for our study.
- We will also be available for feedback up to an hour after the event if you would like to provide additional comments.
- You can also submit feedback via the following email: dbedt.utilitybizmodstudy@hawaii.gov
- Finally, the presentation will be available at: https://energy.hawaii.gov/community-outreach

► Questions? Concerns? Contact Us:

- Bridgett Neely, Bridgett@londoneconomics.com
- Cherrylin Trinidad, cherrylin@londoneconomics.com
- Gabriel Roumy, Gabriel@londoneconomics.com
Agenda

1. About the study
2. Ownership models
3. Regulatory models
4. Summary of preliminary findings
5. Discussions
Group Discussion

Guiding questions for small groups:

1. What do you think are the benefits and drawbacks of the preferred models?

2. Any other comments or concerns?